Serrano v. Prient: Is Public Law 874 Constitutional? by Harris, Robert W.
Volume 2 
Issue 2 Summer 
Summer 1972 
Serrano v. Prient: Is Public Law 874 Constitutional? 
Robert W. Harris 
Recommended Citation 
Robert W. Harris, Serrano v. Prient: Is Public Law 874 Constitutional?, 2 N.M. L. Rev. 286 (1972). 
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol2/iss2/10 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of 
Law. For more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr 
COMMENTS
SERRANO v. PRIEST: IS PUBLIC LAW
874 CONSTITUTIONAL?
In a complex opinion based upon recent United States Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the California system of public school
financing violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. While the precise meaning of the California decision is
as yet unclear, it has been widely noted that affirmance of the deci-
sion by the United States Supreme Court may invalidate school
funding systems in many states.
As yet, little attention has been directed toward resulting con-
stitutional problems involving federal education legislation. If the
California Court is upheld, federal restrictions on state eligibility for
PL 874 "impacted areas" school aid may be unconstitutional, be-
cause the restrictions tend to coerce the states to violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
In Serrano v. Priest, I the California Supreme Court found that the
state school financing system is heavily dependent on local property
taxes, thereby causing substantial inequalities in available per-pupil
revenue among the state's school districts. The court held that the
system therefore invidiously discriminates against the poor, in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.
Two particular holdings of Serrano are of special interest in the
present context. The Court held that the school financing system
may not discriminate on the basis of the fortuitous distribution of
real property among the various school districts of the state.2 But
the Court also appeared to hold that, regardless of the method of
school financing, some degree of territorial uniformity is constitu-
tionally required.3 This holding indicates that even a financing
system not utilizing property taxes may be unconstitutional if there
are great disparities in available per-pupil revenues among the state's
school districts.
The possible implications of Serrano are far reaching indeed, since
school systems in most states have relied on local property taxes as a
major revenue source for many years. In 1969-1970, 52.5% of
1. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). See also Note, Serrano V.
Priest and its Impact on New Mexico, 2 N.M. L. Rev. (1972).
2. Id at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
3. Id. at 612, 487 P.2d at 1261, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
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revenue receipts for American elementary and secondary education
were from local sources,4 though not all of these receipts were from
property taxes.
In contrast to the national norm, New Mexico has derived a much
smaller portion of its educational revenues from local sources. For
1969-1970, only 23.3% of New Mexico elementary and secondary
school revenue was so derived,' an amount less than half the
national percentage. The comparatively light reliance on property
taxes in New Mexico is shown by the fact that the per-capita prop-
erty tax revenue to state and local governments in 1960-1970 was
only $81.1 8, compared to the U.S. average of $167.59.6 One of the
principal reasons for New Mexico's lesser reliance on the property
tax is the fact that 34% of the total acreage in the state is federal
land' and is thus removed from the property tax base.
Not surprisingly, the New Mexico public schools have relied on
federal educational aid funds to a much greater extent than most
other states. In fact, for 1969-1970, New Mexico derived 14% of its
school revenues from federal aid, while the national average was only
6.7%. Such reliance on federal aid results not only from a smaller
property tax base, but also from the lack of adequate alternative
state revenue sources. New Mexico ranks 49th among the states in
personal income per school age child,8 partly because the state is
highest in the nation for percentage of school age population.9
An important form of federal educational aid is the "impacted
areas" aid provided under Public Law 874. These funds are intended
to compensate local school districts for the increased financial
burdens produced by federal activity, particularly from the removal
of land from the property tax base through federal acquisition and
from the presence of additional school children associated with fed-
eral installations. The federal grants are computed on the basis of
national standards, but are provided directly to the local school
districts. The state is forbidden to reduce its support for the schools
of impact districts, by a requirement that the Public Law (PL) 874
money be withheld if such action is taken. Thus the impacted areas
program has produced wide inequalities in per pupil expenditures
4. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State-Local Finances and Sug-
gested Legislation 187 (1971).
5. Id.
6. Report of New Mexico Revenue Commissioner Franklin Jones to New Mexico Legisla-
tive Interim Tax Study Committee, Nov. 17, 1971, at 8.
7. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 189 (1971).
8. Franklin Jones, supra note 6, at 4.
9. Id. at table 7.
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among the New Mexico school districts; variations of nearly 100%
are not uncommon.' 0
If Serrano is affirmed by the Supreme Court, there are two related
constitutional challenges to Public Law 874 which may be made.
First, if school financing may not be based on local property taxes,
PL 874 may be challenged to the extent that it in effect provides
property tax revenue to school districts, by compensating them for
federal land acquisition. Secondly, if Serrano requires some degree of
uniformity in per pupil expenditures among the state's school dis-
tricts, the PL 874 restriction forbidding a state to consider the 874
grants in its allocations may be invalid as coercing the state to violate
the Equal Protection Clause. These questions will be approached
from the viewpoint of Serrano and previous litigation involving
Public Law 874.
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND PREVIOUS LITIGATION
INVOLVING PUBLIC LAW 874
Originally enacted in 1950, PL 874 may now be found in the
United States Code at 20 U.S.C.A. § § 236-241, under Chapter 13,
subchapter I, "Assistance for Local Educational Agencies in Areas
Affected by Federal Activity." The basic congressional policy of PL
874 is expressed in § 236, which states that the assistance is pro-
vided to local school districts where:
(1) The revenues available to such agencies from local sources have
been reduced as the result of the acquisition of real property by the
United States; or(2) such agencies provide education for children residing on federal
property; or
(3) such agencies provide education for children whose parents are
employed on Federal property; or(4) there has been a sudden and substantial increase in school
attendance as a result of federal activities.
At the time PL 874 was initially being considered, a congressional
committee report implied that such assistance was not expected to
lead to any reduction in state assistance: "The effect of the pay-
ments provided by this section is to compensate the local educational
agency for the loss in its local revenues. There is no compensation for
any loss in State revenues. "'' (Emphasis added.)
Nonetheless a number of states reduced their support for districts
receiving PL 874 funds. As a result, in 1966 Congress enacted
10. See Note, Serrano v. Priest and its Impact on New Mexico, 2 N.M. L. Rev. p. 280,
table III.
11. Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F. Supp. 869, 874 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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§ 240(d)(l), allowing proportionate reductions in federal assistance
wherever state aid is reduced. The committee report supporting the
amendment made the Congressional intent clear:
Fifteen states offset the amount of PL 874 funds received by their
school districts by reducing part of their state aid to those districts.
This is in direct contravention to Congressional Intent. Impact aid
funds are intended to compensate districts for loss of tax revenues
due to federal connection, not to substitute for State funds the
districts would otherwise receive. 1 2 (Emphasis added.)
However, the remedy provided by § 240(d)(1) was a discretionary
one; it did not require reduction of federal support.
Then in 1968, in Shepheard v. Godwin,' I a federal district court
held that state reductions in aid to PL 874 districts were not only
contrary to the Congressional intent, but were void under the
Supremacy Clause. The same result was reached by other federal
courts in Douglas Independent School District No. 3 v. Jorgenson,
1 4
Hergenreter v. Hayden, ' and Carlsbad Union School District of San
Diego County v. Rafferty. 16
The Equal Protection Clause was also involved in Shepheard and
Carlsbad. In Shepheard the federal court held that, in addition to
violating the Supremacy Clause, the particular system employed by
Virginia to reduce state aid to PL 874 districts violated the Equal
Protection Clause, even though the effect of the state reduction was
to make school spending more uniform throughout the state.
Virginia attempted to exclude both the PL 874 money and the
children associated with federal installations in figuring its school
fund allocations, but the Court held that these children were entitled
to be counted on the same basis as other children.' ' On the other
hand, in Carlsbad, supra, the Court specifically held that California's
reduction in state aid to PL 874 districts did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause:
In good faith, the state of California has attempted to devise a
system whereby both state and federal aid are used to provide a
more uniform educational opportunity for every child in the state.
There is no doubt that the state has honestly attempted to achieve
educational parity. While such an attempt may conflict with federal
law and thus the Supremacy clause, it does not violate plaintiffs
right to equal protection.
1 8
12. Id. at 875.
13. 280 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1968).
14. 293 F. Supp. 849 (D.S.D. 1968).
15. 295 F. Supp. 251 (D. Kan. 1968).
16. 300 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1969), affd 429 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1970).
17. Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F. Supp. 869, 875-876 (E.D. Va. 1968).
18. Carlsbad Union School District v. Rafferty, 300 F. Supp. 434, 442 (S.D. Cal. 1969).
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Thus, it appears that a reduction in state aid to offset PL 874 funds
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the federal
children are explicitly excluded in the state's calculations.
The Shepheard case was followed by Congressional enactment in
1968 of § 240(d)(2), which flatly prohibits payments of PL 874
funds to impact districts in states which reduce allocations as a result
of such payments:
No payments may be made during any fiscal year to any local educa-
tional agency in any State which has taken into consideration pay-
ments under this subchapter in determining the eligibility of any
local educational agency for State aid ....
In a sense this amendment is superfluous under Shepheard, since any
state regulations of this type would be unconstitutional. Nonetheless
an additional barrier was provided against state reductions for school
aid for PL 874 districts.
IF SERRANO IS AFFIRMED, IS PUBLIC LAW 874
CONSTITUTIONAL?
Even before the Serrano decision, one observer noted' 9 the con-
stitutional problem of PL 874 under the Equal Protection Clause.
After observing that the states would probably acquiesce in§ 240(d)(2) to avoid losing federal money, he said:
Yet this result ... produces two constitutionally unacceptable
conditions, each of which seems to violate the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause. The first is produced by the state
making an affirmative choice to allow considerable benefit to be
conferred on a class of people defined by the sole criterion of their
residence.... The other problem lies in the area of the emerging
claim to a fourteenth amendment right of equal access to educa-
tional opportunity . .. involving the concept that where the state
undertakes to provide free public education ... it may not
arbitrarily cause a considerably lesser or greater educational oppor-
tunity, measured by dollar expenditures, to be provided to a class
defined by strictly geographical terms .. .20
This raises constitutional questions concerning the state's action in
choosing to allow children of PL 874 districts to receive additional
benefits, as well as the problem of the resulting non-uniformity itself.
If Serrano is upheld, in whole or in part, can PL 874 itself be consti-
tutional if it tends to coerce states to violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment? There is fairly good authority that the answer is no.
It should be noted that even if Serrano is affirmed only on the
19. Note, The Dilemma of Federal Impact Area School Aid, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 33 (1970).
20. Id. at 56-57.
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holding that school funding may not be substantially based on local
property taxes, PL 874 may be unconstitutional. As § 236 points
out, one of the principal reasons for federal aid is to compensate
school districts for property taxes lost through federal land acquisi-
tion. To the extent that this is true PL 874 money is in effect
property tax money; the effect of PL 874 grants is to continue to
base school funding on property distributions.
If the stronger Serrano holding regarding educational uniformity is
upheld, there is a strong case against the PL 874 restriction on reduc-
tion of state aid. The effect of § 240(d)(2) is to coerce the states to
continue nonuniform educational expenditures.
Can the federal government coerce states to violate the Equal
Protection Clause? In Shapiro v. Thompson,2 which struck down a
one year state welfare residency requirement, the state argued that
§ 402(b) of the Social Security Act of 1935 authorized the states to
impose such requirements. The Supreme Court said that the section
did not authorize such restrictions and went on to say that if it were
construed to authorize them, it would be unconstitutional: "Con-
gress may not authorize the states to violate the equal protection
clause." 2 2 And in Graham v. Richardson,2" which struck down
special welfare residency requirements for aliens, the Supreme Court
said: ". . . congress does not have the power to authorize the indi-
vidual States to violate the Equal Protection Clause." 24 If Congress
may not authorize such violations of the Constitution, it follows, a
fortiori that it may not coerce them.
For these reasons, it is concluded that if Serrano is affirmed, in
whole or in part, there will be a basis for a serious constitutional
challenge to Public Law 874, in regard to the appropriations com-
pensating for lost property taxes, the restrictions on state funding, or
both.
ROBERT W. HARRIS
21. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
22. Id. at 641.
23. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
24. Id. at 382.
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